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EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES 
ON MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, Volume I. Edited by Klaus 
Hopt. Berlin, West Germany: Walter de Gruyter & Co. 1982. Pp. 
viii, 262. $51. 
At a time when corporate mergers and acquisitions dominate the Amer-
ican economic scene, it is appropriate to compare the approaches of other 
industrialized countries to the problems posed by this form of business ac-
tivity. In European Merger Controls, Klaus Hopt presents a collection of 
legal and economic analyses of the merger control systems in several Euro-
pean countries, and of the European Economic Community (EEC), that 
should interest both students of comparative law and practitioners of inter-
national law. 
The articles collected by Professor Hopt note that, until recently, most 
European nations did not perceive a threat from excessive economic con-
centration. Although the trend toward economic concentration has been 
evident for several decades (pp. 155-57), most European governments actu-
ally favored this practice. Lawmakers in France (pp. 104-05), Great Britain 
(p. 47), and Germany (pp. 73-74), among others, believed that large enter-
prises contributed to efficiency and helped maintain a competitive edge in 
world markets. Not surprisingly, the anti-merger legislation adopted in Eu-
rope during the 1960's and 1970's reflects the strong philosophical under-
current that "bigger is better." Consequently, the book maintains that 
much of the European anti-merger legislation contains procedural and sub-
stantive weaknesses. 
The articles note three common problems in this legislation. First, the 
criteria used to investigate the legality of a merger are often ill-defined. 1 
Second, the procedural steps used to invalidate a merger often favor the 
merging enterprises over the government investigators.2 Finally, most of 
1. Throughout the text the commentators note the amorphous standards that are used to 
test the legality of a merger. In Great Britain, for example, a merger cannot be invalidated 
unless it is against the "public interest." Although the British merger control law lists several 
factors to be considered when assessing the "public interest," such as whether the merger will 
promote competition, reduce costs, and maintain employment, pp. 57-58, this list is merely 
illustrative. The author of the article on the British experience admits that "in practice the 
statutory guidelines were never considered strictly and members of the [Monopolies) Commis-
sion in the final analysis would utilize a large measure of intuition." P. 195. 
The British system can be compared with the German merger control law which has a 
different procedural structure but leads to a similar public interest evaluation. The first phase 
of a German merger investigation is strictly legalistic and looks to the size of the merging 
enterprises and the potential for market domination. Pp. 79-80. However, even if a merger is 
declared illegal, the decision can be appealed to the Federal Minister of Economics who then 
can exempt the merger if the "public interest" in general justifies the merger. P. 81. The 
French, p. 116, and Swiss, p.130, commentators also criticize the imprecision of the standards 
used to test the validity of mergers in their countries. 
2. The procedural devices that favor the merging corporations over the investigative body 
include placing the burden of proof on the government to show that the merger is against the 
public interest, p. 195, and making certain political decisions on mergers virtually nonreview-
able by the courts, p. 8 I. 
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the statutes contain escape clauses that may permit the merger even if it is 
found to be illegal.3 
Given these weaknesses, it is not surprising that most of the commenta-
tors in European Merger Control conclude that the merger control legisla-
tion in their respective countries is largely ineffective in practice. For 
example, one commentator notes that in Britain, few of the eligible mergers 
are investigated, let alone invalidated (p. 46). Another article concludes 
that Swiss legislation has become ineffective due to the many exceptions 
that have "perforated" the original intent of the law (p. 128).4 On the other 
hand, the German merger control system is rated as a qualified success be-
cause it serves as a deterrent to mergers and acquisitions by the largest cor-
porations (p. 96). The German system has the advantage of clear criteria 
and legal presumptions which lead to investigation and prima facie invali-
dation of a merger (pp. 79-80). Since these criteria include the size of the 
merging enterprises and the resultant market share, large corporations face 
rigid scrutiny and are thus deterred from engaging in much potential 
merger activity. 
Interestingly, although the European nations surveyed have been 
largely ineffective in controlling economic concentration in the industrial 
setting, some countries have been able to control other mergers for 
noneconomic reasons. For example, the French (p. 120) and the British 
(p.49) have stringently controlled newspaper mergers because of the threat 
they see to freedom of expression. This experience demonstrates that at 
least some of the European nations can implement effective anti-merger 
legislation given a real political or popular commitment. 
Hopt's collection allows the reader to compare merger control legisla-
tion not only among European nations but also between the individual 
countries and the EEC. Merger control has been a part of the EEC since 
the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty of 1951 (p. 249). This 
treaty was followed in 1973 by a comprehensive proposal for merger con-
trol5 (p. 182) which has bogged down in a bureaucratic morass and may 
never be finally approved (p. 184). Until the national laws are strengthened 
or a comprehensive community-wide merger control law is enacted, the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice will continue to control unacceptable mergers by 
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, which prohibits the abuse of a dominant 
position (pp. 174-75). 
From an American perspective it is not surprising to find European 
3. The defenses available to justify a merger that would otherwise be illegal vary from 
country to country. For example, a merger in France that is harmful to competition can be 
justified if the effect of the merger is to increase efficiency or productivity and thereby contrib-
utes to "economic and social progress." P. 117. In Britain, p. 55 and Germany, p. 92, there is 
also a defense available for an anti-competitive merger that increases efficiency. These de-
fenses have thus far been rejected in the United States. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 
386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). But see 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW§ 1016 (1980) 
(arguing that the efficiency defense should be available). 
4. The author of the article on the Swiss Cartel Act cites one example of exceptions that 
reduce the effectiveness of the Act. The Cartel Act provides that interference with competition 
is lawful when it is warranted by an "overriding legitimate interest" and does not excessively 
interfere with free competition. P. 128. 
5. For the full text of the proposed EEC merger control law, see pp. 253-62. 
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lawmakers facing a great many difficulties with their relatively new merger 
control laws. The antitrust/merger control area has been among the most 
complicated in American jurisprudence and is continually evolving. In 
fact, the current difficulties facing the European countries are reminiscent 
of the American experience in the early years of the Clayton Act.6 
The editor of European Merger Control succeeds in his basic goal. His 
collection of articles addresses the concrete problems of merger control in 
Europe from several perspectives and provides the reader with an overview 
of the political and legal problems facing policymakers in Europe.7 The 
presentation permits readers to compare current legislation and actual prac-
tice under the acts, to discern trends for the future of merger control in 
Europe, and to draw parallels to the American experience. Finally, the arti-
cles cite many sources, and contain bibliographies and the texts of several 
European merger control laws which furnish the reader with a starting 
point for further investigation of the vast literature on the subject. 
The articles in European Merger Control delineate the common practical 
and theoretical problems that face the European nations in their attempts to 
control economic concentration. Until these nations accept the principle 
that competition is an end in itself, however, there will be little effective 
merger control in Europe. 
6. See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, 576-675 (1977). 
For a collection of articles reviewing the recent history of section 7 of the Clayton Act and the 
effect of the 1950 amendments, see 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1391, 1391-1469 (1982). 
7. Volume II of Professor Hopt's collection, GROUPS OF COMPANIES IN EUROPEAN LAWS, 
presents more specific studies of particular consolidations in Germany, France, Great Britain, 
Switzerland, Scandinavia, and the EEC. Several selections in Volume II appear in French. 
